Appeal – Written Reserved Decision dated 24 August 2026 – Cody Cole

Background

1. On 24 July 2025, the Appellant was served a notice by Racing Investigator Mr Richard Carr requiring the Appellant to undertake a drug test. The notice required the Appellant to attend a testing facility between 7.30am and 10.30am on that day.

2. The Appellant did not attend the testing and was subsequently charged with a breach of Rule 801(1)(k) of the New Zealand Thoroughbred Rules of Racing (“the Rules”). Rule 801(1)(k) provides that a person commits a Serious Racing Offence if the person:

“wilfully fails to perform an act ordered by an Investigator to be performed by him”.

3. The Appellant defended the charge. He accepted he did not provide a urine sample within the timeframe, but said he did not wilfully fail to provide the sample within the timeframe or he had a reasonable excuse for failing to do so. This excuse was that on returning to his farm, he had to tend to an injured horse which was an unexpected animal welfare issue that prevented him from returning to the Racecourse as requested, in time to be tested.

4. Following a defended hearing held on 17 December 2025, the Adjudicative Committee in a Written Reserved Decision dated 30 January 2026, rejected that excuse, finding the Appellant guilty of breaching Rule 801(1)(k).

5. There was a penalty hearing held on 13 April 2026. In a Written Reserved Decision dated 15 April 2026, the Adjudicative Committee disqualified the Appellant for 12 months, to commence two days after that decision. The disqualification was, however, partially stayed until 27 April 2026.

6. The Appellant now appeals both Decisions issued by the Adjudicative Committee.

Facts

7. Helpfully, the parties were able to submit an agreed statement of facts to the Adjudicative Committee. These agreed facts are:

i. The Appellant is the holder of a Class A Trainers Licence issued by New Zealand Thoroughbred Racing (NZTR).

ii. He has held his Class A Trainers Licence since September 2018, having previously held a Class B Trainers Licence since May 2016. He has held an assortment of riding licences issued by NZTR since January 2009.

iii. He is 35 years of age. He currently has 95 horses registered in his name and training with NZTR.

iv. On Thursday 24 July 2025, Investigators from the Racing Integrity Board conducted drug testing at the Matamata Racecourse and surrounding thoroughbred training establishments.

v. On that day, Mr Cole and members of this team were working horses at the track and in Tirau.

vi. Part of Mr Cole’s team’s tasks that day included carrying out a “safety sensitive activity” at the Matamata Racecourse.

vii. As he was performing a safety sensitive activity that day, he was selected for testing.

viii. At 7.39am, Racing Investigator Richard Carr (Mr Carr) served on Mr Cole, a drug testing notification form requiring him to present at The Drug Detection Agency (TDDA) van for testing on site between 7.30am and 10.30am and to supply a sample.

ix. Mr Carr explained the location of the parked TDDA van to Mr Cole, which he acknowledged. Mr Carr handed the notice to Mr Cole. Mr Cole accepts he was aware that he was required to present himself for testing by 10.30am that day.

x. At around 8.25am, Mr Cole asked Mr Carr if he could leave the Matamata track to return his horse truck full of horses to his training facility in Tirau. Mr Carr permitted Mr Cole to do so, but told him that failing to return, would likely result in a charge for “failing to provide for a drug test”. Mr Cole acknowledged this, stating that he would return for testing before the 10.30am cut off for testing.

xi. At 10.19am, Mr Carr received a text message from Mr Cole containing a recorded MP4 video file with audio commentary from Mr Cole of him holding the lead rope of a horse.

xii. The audio stated – “Richard it is (the video shows an Apple watch at 9.45am) and I’m just dealing with a horse that has gone into a fence last night, waiting for a vet. You are probably going to look at me with some suspicion that’s why I’m taking this video. But um obviously I need to sort this out and then talk to you later we will sort out whatever we need to do on that front”.

xiii. At 10.30am, Mr Carr telephoned Mr Cole, with the call going unanswered. Mr Carr left a voice message requesting that Mr Cole return the call. Mr Carr made a further call to Mr Cole at 10.32am, which also went unanswered.

xiv. At 10.40am, the TDDA van was stood down from the racecourse.

xv. At 12.04pm, Mr Carr sent a text message to Mr Cole, noting the two prior attempts to call and voicemail and requesting that Mr Cole call him back urgently. Mr Cole did not respond by text message or phone call.

xvi. On 31 July 2025, Mr Carr contacted Mr Cole to request an interview seeking an explanation. Mr Cole asked if it was being treated as serious and said that if it was, he would speak to a lawyer before attending an in-person meeting. Mr Carr emailed Mr Cole a short time later (at 4.57pm on 31 July), requesting details of the horse and it’s injuries, the timeline, persons present and details of the vet who attended.

xvii. Mr Carr’s email to Mr Cole also included a directive prohibiting Mr Cole from engaging in any safety sensitive activity including riding or handling a horse at any racecourse, training facility, or trainers premises, until he provided a negative drug test and informing the Respondent that Mr Carr would see if the TDDA could accommodate him for testing immediately (i.e. that day).

xviii. On 1 August 2025, Mr Cole was tested by the TDDA and returned a clear test. As this test was taken 8 days after 24 July 2025, which is outside the expected detection window for some substances, it does not prove nor disprove whether Mr Cole was impaired on 24 July 2025.

xix. On 7 August 2025, Mr Cole provided a written explanation via his Legal Counsel including attaching a vet report. The vet report recorded:

• A veterinarian from Waikato Equine Vet Centre attended the horse “Circus Maximus/Not A Dancer 23C” a two year old colt on 24 July 2025 after it sustained injuries running through a fence.

• On examination the veterinarian identified wounds to both hind limbs and the left fore. They were cleaned and examined and appeared superficial in nature. The colt was placed on antibiotics for three days with recommendation to keep the legs wrapped while being boxed.

xx. Mr Cole stated in the written explanation provided by his Legal Counsel, that the injury had been identified at approximately 9.15am by Eilish Bragg, an NZTR licenced employee of Mr Cole.

xxi. The email from Mr Cole’s Legal Counsel also recorded Mr Cole’s statement “I realise I should have responded to Richard and I am sorry for not doing so. However with the time restrictions and dealing with the injured horse I wasn’t going to be able to make it back by 10.30am.”

xxii. Mr Cole has previously been drug tested on one occasion, providing a clear sample in December 2023 (prior to the cleared test on 1 August 2025).

xxiii. New Zealand Thoroughbred Racing confirms that Mr Cole has no prior serious racing offenses on record.

8. Evidence was also called at the substantive Adjudicative Committee Hearing on 13 April 2026. The Respondent called one witness, Senior Investigator Mr Carr. His evidence was largely unchallenged by the Appellant in relation to the request to provide a urine sample and the failure to do so. Mr Carr was questioned about his email to the Appellant asking for details about the injured horse and the circumstances surrounding the treatment of the horse and why he couldn’t return to provide a sample as requested. Mr Carr accepted that the Appellant answered those questions and provided details such as the location of the injured horse, the nature of the injury, what happened, who was present, and the details of the vet who attended and a report from the vet.

9. Fourteen days later, the Appellant was charged without the Senior Investigator making any inquiries in relation to the information provided to him by the Appellant. Importantly, the Investigator was asked about terms of understanding circumstances that the Appellant found himself in, whether it would have helped the Investigator to have made some inquiries about that day. The Investigator rejected that, saying that wasn’t his role.

10. The Investigator accepted, therefore he had no idea about the specific horse or its injuries or any information other than that which had been provided to him.

11. Importantly for our purposes, the Appellant had told the Respondent that the horse was volatile and had injured itself, meaning it required urgent veterinary attention. The Appellant was the only person able to calm and deal with that horse, despite him having other staff present. The Respondent made no inquiries to determine whether this was true.

12. Crucially, Mr Carr under cross-examination, accepted that he couldn’t provide the Adjudicative Committee with any assistance as to whether the Appellant returning to the racecourse was realistic or reasonable in light of the animal welfare issue, which the Appellant said he was facing.

13. Importantly, Mr Cairney for the Appellant, said to Mr Carr that if the Adjudicative Committee wanted to consider whether the Respondent had evidence to rebut reasonable excuse or wilfulness, the Respondent could not provide anything about what occurred at Tirau. He accepted he could not.

14. The Investigator accepted the welfare of the horses under his charge are particularly important, as is the welfare of his workers.

15. The Investigator also accepted as an RIB Investigator, that the charge which was laid against the Appellant was serious, with serious consequences, and thus there must be robust and cogent evidence proving the charge, before the charge could be proved.

16. The Investigator seemed to become somewhat distracted by an irrelevant issue, namely that after the Appellant sent a video to Mr Carr of the horse on the day and explained he would be late as he might not be able to make the time frame. He did not reply to the follow-up text from Mr Carr, nor the follow-up in the coming days.

17. Ultimately, he accepted he wasn’t in the position to tell the Adjudicative Committee about the reasonableness of not returning to the racecourse from Tirau. That was because he hadn’t investigated anything about what the Appellant had said in his statement and the circumstances he had set out, which he said prevented him from returning.

18. After the Informant presented its case by calling its only witness, Mr Carr, the Appellant presented its case. The Appellant gave evidence. He explained how difficult the horse in question had been to deal with in days just prior when it had been gelded. The Appellant said he had never had to sedate a colt for a third time to get it on to the ground prior to a gelding procedure. When this horse was not sedated, he was uncontrollable. This was the horse that would later injure himself in the coming days.

19. The Appellant talked about being requested to provide a urine sample that day and being given permission to return to his stables first, before returning to the racecourse to provide the sample. He accepted he should have given the sample there and then, but thought he had time and gave evidence about the unsettled horses he was dealing with and the need to return them home to his stables at Tirau.

20. The Appellant gave evidence about the time it took to get from the racecourse to his farm and then on his arrival, being told about the injured horse. Importantly, and given the state of the injury and where it was located on the horse, he gave evidence that injuries in that location can often prove to have serious consequences. He decided he would remain with the horse, and even though he had staff present, no one else could deal with it.

21. The Veterinary Surgeon was called. The Appellant remained with the horse, and the upshot was that he felt that there was not sufficient time to then return to the racecourse to provide the requested sample.

22. The Appellant called the Veterinary Surgeon to give evidence. She said she could not know how serious the injury was until the wound had been cleaned, but once she had done so, she was able to assess the injury as being superficial. She was unable to recall the actual time she arrived at the stables, but initially she had concerns the horse had gone through a fence. She had gelded the horse on the day before and he had been very difficult that day. She had a vivid memory of this horse. She would not normally have such a memory, but did so, because the horse had been so difficult during the gelding procedure.

Appellant’s Submissions

23. Before the Adjudicative Committee and this Tribunal, the Appellant accepted he failed to perform the act which had been requested of him, but asserted he did not do so wilfully as he could not return to be tested within the timeframe as ordered, given the animal welfare issue he encountered with the injured horse.

24. Mr Cairney submitted this Rule is classified as a Serious Racing Offence, with a significant penalty attached to it:

Rule 801(2) a person who commits a Serious Racing Offence shall be liable to:

(a) Be disqualified for any specific period or for life: and/or
(b) Be suspended from holding or obtaining a licence for a period not exceeding 12 months. If a licence is renewed during a term of suspension then the suspension shall continue to apply to the renewed licence: and/or
(c) A fine not exceeding $50,000.

This factor and the fact the offence requires proof by the prosecution that the Appellant acted wilfully, means the Rule is only breached if the Appellant had wilfully failed to perform the act.

25. The Appellant submitted at the hearing, that his decision to remain with the injured horse was not wilful in the true sense of the meaning of that word, because he had to remain and look after the injured horse.

26. At the hearing, the Appellant was critical of the Respondent’s failure to investigate information provided by the Appellant to the Respondent about the circumstances of the horse’s injury, and why he had to remain with it. The agreed facts and evidence called by the Appellant at the hearing, provided the basis for a reasonable excuse or as the Appellant asserted, that he had not acted wilfully.

27. The Appellant said that this evidence provided a reasonable excuse or affirmative defence which the Respondent had not shaken or weakened and as such, the prosecution had failed to either prove the Appellant acted wilfully, or failed to disprove on the balance of probabilities, this affirmative defence.

Respondent’s Submissions

1. Before the Adjudicative Committee, the Respondent said the charge was proved on the evidence, because Mr Cole accepted he did not provide a sample within the stipulated timeframe. The fact that he decided to remain with his horse, was a choice he made. He chose the injured horse over his obligations to return and provide a urine sample, which made him guilty, because he deliberately did not return and thereby deliberately did not provide a sample.

2. The Respondent phrased it by saying the Appellant had choices. The Respondent was alive to the excuse offered by the Appellant and, whether it was reasonable by drawing the Adjudicative Committee’s attention to the need for the reasonableness of the excuse to be assessed objectively, as to whether an ordinary New Zealander would consider to be reasonable in all circumstances. The Respondent referred to a number of cases on the issue of reasonableness:

A v Police (1999) 2NZCR501 at 926 Baragwanath J said:

“I accordingly reject the argument that the term “reasonable excuse” means “reasonable” only in the subjective perception of the Defendant on to engage in violence without sanction. “Reasonable” has been adopted by the Law in a range of context as proposing an objective standard as a societal norm. In the context I consider it to mean an excuse which an ordinary New Zealander would consider to be reasonable in all the circumstances.”

3. The Respondent said it could not be considered reasonable to make a decision at 9.45am on the morning to not return to Matamata, especially given the Appellant took no steps to correspond with Mr Carr in any way.

4. It was submitted the Appellant took a calculated risk by not providing the sample before leaving the racecourse and not being able to return in time. This can be compared to the RIB v Balle [RIB v Balle (24 April 2025)] case, where arriving for testing was left as late as possible.

5. There is a real risk of allowing a reasonable excuse to be a defence to this charge as to do so, could potentially undermine the integrity of the testing procedures contained within the Rules.

6. It was submitted the Appellant willingly did not provide the necessary sample. There is no question he did not do so, but the issue becomes whether his failure to do so was a willing choice.

7. The failure arose because of the choices the Appellant made, including failing to contact Mr Carr leading up to the close of the testing window and also over the subsequent 8 days. Had he made contact with Mr Carr to explore whether there were any actions available to remedy the situation, he may well have provided an assurance to the Adjudicative Committee, that he did not avoid the test for the purposes of providing a positive result.

The Adjudicative Committee Decision

8. The Adjudicative Committee, in its Written Decision, set out the agreed facts provided by witnesses at the hearing. It also detailed Counsel’s various submissions before moving to a conclusion.

9. In this conclusion, they summarised some evidence, but not other key evidence which hadn’t been challenged by the Respondent, or when the Respondent had questioned the witnesses on those facts, the witnesses had confirmed their own evidence.

10. The Adjudicative Committee stated the Veterinary Surgeon’s evidence was unchallenged, and the Committee accepted that. The Committee then set out what it said were key facts to prove the charge and it accepted that, even though the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, in serious disciplinary cases such as this one, “the quality and cogency of the Informant’s evidence required to meet this standard increases with the seriousness of the subject matter.”

11. The Committee noted that the Appellant wasn’t tested and set out his explanation for why that was so. The Committee rejected the suggestion that the Respondent had to fully investigate the reasons advanced by the Appellant for failing to comply with the Rule. The Committee said, the Defendant holds the burden of proof when asserting an affirmative defence.

12. The Adjudicative Committee stated:

“an affirmative defence is where the [defendant] introduces new facts or evidence to justify or excuse their actions. The burden of proof shifts to the [defendant] in this circumstance. It was for Mr Cole to persuade the Adjudicative Committee, on the balance of probabilities that the circumstances were such as to excuse or justify his choices. It was not for the Respondent to present that evidence. He has failed to satisfy the Adjudicative Committee on the balance probabilities that the circumstances existed to justify or excuse his failure to comply with the testing requirements”.

The Committee therefore found “the charge was proven and that Mr Cole acted unreasonably, deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or by inadvertence, in failing to comply with the directive to undergo drug testing on 24 July 2025 at Matamata.”

Discussion

13. This Appeal is being conducted pursuant to Rule 1005(3) of the Rules. This reads:

“All appeals shall except when and to the extent that the Appeals Tribunal otherwise directs be by way of rehearing based on the evidence adduced at the hearing conducted by the persons or body whose decision is appealed against”

14. This means this is a general Appeal by way of rehearing. The Appeals Tribunal must consider the evidence which was given before the Adjudicative Committee and after having read the Decision and heard further submissions from Counsel for both parties, it will form its own opinion as to whether or not a breach of the Rule has occurred.

15. We received submissions from both parties relating to the burden of proof. It has now been well established within racing jurisprudence.

16. The case Z v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee (2008) NZSC 55, (2009) 1NZLR1, a Court of Appeal Decision where it was noted that:

“While the standard of proof is the civil standard of balance of probabilities in serious disciplinary cases such as this case the quality and the cogency of the Informant’s evidence required to meet the standard increases with the seriousness of the subject matter.”

17. A breach of any of the provisions of Rule 801 constitutes a Serious Racing Offence. Therefore, by the nature of that classification and the potential penalties available, the burden of proof, while still being on the balance of probabilities in serious disciplinary cases such as this case, the quality and cogency of the Informant’s evidence required to meet the standard increases with the seriousness of the subject matter.

18. The Appellant has raised the affirmative defence of reasonable excuse. Evidence was given by the Appellant before the Adjudicative Committee in support of his affirmative defence. When an affirmative defence is raised, the burden of proving that defence passes to the party who is raising it. Therefore, it was incumbent on the Appellant to prove his defence of reasonable excuse on the balance of probabilities. However, once that defence has been properly raised, if the Respondent wishes to challenge it and say it should not be accepted, it needs to do so. There needs to be clear evidence and reasons why the Adjudicative Committee, or indeed this Tribunal, should decide that the Appellant has not proved the defence to the requisite standard of on the balance of probabilities.

19. The Adjudicative Committee erred in this respect, because it did not squarely tackle this evidence and say why it found the evidence not credible, or not creditable and unreliable.

20. On the contrary, it said it accepted the Veterinary Surgeon’s evidence.

21. The parties were able to agree on a significant number of the facts giving rise to the charge. Key facts introduced by the Appellant were unchallenged and unanswerable. This was because the Respondent deliberately chose not to make any inquiries themselves.

22. We have given very careful consideration to whether the actions of the Appellant on that morning could be considered reasonable and therefore whether his failure to perform the action required was wilful.

23. We have carefully considered the evidence which was given. This evidence was provided primarily by the Appellant. The evidence is clear up until the time of his arrival a Tirau.

24. What does become somewhat unclear, relates to the time various matters took place on his arrival.

25. The Appellant gave evidence he arrived at Tirau at approximately 9am. On arrival, he was confronted by one of his staff, Eilish Bragg, endeavouring to attend to a volatile and highly strung gelding. This horse had suffered an injury overnight, which required Veterinary attention.

26. The Appellant gave evidence of his reputation within the thoroughbred industry of being highly confident with “difficult” horses. He gave evidence he was the only person within his stable who could handle such a volatile animal. To do otherwise, may well have subjected either or both of his staff and the horse to a serious risk of injury or damage.

27. He gave evidence that one of his staff members from the Matamata Stable had contacted a Veterinary Surgeon. This Veterinary Surgeon, Dr Tara McCrissican knew the horse well, as she had performed a gelding procedure on the horse the previous day. She gave evidence also of the volatility and flighty nature of this horse during the gelding procedure. She had not come across such volatility before. Neither had the Appellant in his experience.

28. The Appellant sent a video to Mr Carr showing him holding a lead rope on the horse. This video stated the time was 9.45am, but it was received by Mr Carr at 10.19am.

29. The Veterinary Surgeon had not arrived by 9.45am and she was unable to state with any accuracy the actual time of arrival. She gave evidence she sedated the horse and then “flushed out” the wound. She was then able to diagnose the injuries were superficial and after prescribing a course of antibiotics, advised the horse should remain boxed for 3 days. Her estimation was the time of diagnosis, would have been approximately 30 minutes.

30. We also heard from the Appellant, it would have taken him 25 minutes (give or take) to travel back to Matamata from Tirau. He realised at 9.45am, he would be unable to make it back to Matamata by 10.30am, which was the closing time available for the testing window. This was because the Veterinary Surgeon had not as yet, arrived at the Tirau Stable.

31. The Appellant further stated he was unable to receive phone calls or texts from Mr Carr, due to poor cell phone coverage on his property.

32. The Appellant further stated he simply could not leave this horse, from an animal welfare and health and safety perspective, until at least the Veterinary Surgeon had arrived at his property and administered appropriate sedation.

33. The Appellant submitted all of this evidence was to a large degree, unchallenged. That is correct.

34. At the request of Mr Carr, Counsel for the Appellant had provided him with contact details of all of the persons who were involved with the horse that morning, but no further investigation work was carried out by the Informant.

35. Given the wording of Rule 1005(3) of the Rules, we must make our decision based solely on the evidence which was given before the Adjudicative Committee.

36. We heard no counter evidence by the Respondent to:

– The volatility or otherwise of the horse
– The ability of Eilish Bragg or any other staff member to adequately control the horse
– The time of arrival at the property by the Veterinary Surgeon
– The time taken by the Veterinary Surgeon to at least administer sedation
– The extent or otherwise of cell phone coverage at Tirau

37. The Appellant was not without fault. By his own admission, he took no steps to contact Mr Carr once the horse had been suitably sedated. Instead, he moved on to other tasks around the stables. By his own admission, he got his priorities wrong on that day.

38. Nor did the Appellant take any steps after the testing window had closed at 10.30am, to contact Mr Carr to endeavour to remedy the situation in some way.

39. However, we can only determine this Appeal based on this evidence which was given at the hearing and that evidence was the Appellant was the only person capable of handling this horse and out of concern for matters of animal welfare and health and safety, it was essential he remain with the horse until proper sedation had been administered. We were not able to establish the exact time of that sedation and therefore we can only deal with the evidence given, which was to the effect that he was unable to return to Matamata by 10.30am.

40. This is a Serious Racing Offence. We have listened to both parties as to the interpretation of the word “wilful”. The facts are clear that the Appellant was served with a notice to provide a urine sample and he did not do so. The only issue is whether his failure to do so was wilful (that is deliberate), or even if it was whether he had a reasonable excuse for not providing one.

41. He may well have given his sample prior to leaving Matamata, but he was given express permission by Mr Carr to leave the racecourse. The issue is not what time he could have provided the sample by, but rather, whether or not he had provided the sample by 10.30am. He did not do so.

42. We therefore considered whether there was a reasonable excuse for failing to do so. Based on the evidence which was given before the Adjudicative Committee, we are of the view there was a reasonable excuse to not make it back to Matamata by 10.30am. It was entirely reasonable to look after the welfare of an injured horse and to remain with it until it had been seen by the Veterinary Surgeon and sedated, if indeed he was the only person able to do that task. There was no evidence to say otherwise, and indeed all the evidence called by the Respondent suggested that was so.

43. Given what is at stake in finding a serious racing offence proven, when such evidence of reasonable excuse is provided to the Respondent, it is incumbent upon the Respondent if it wishes to submit the evidence should not be accepted, to investigate it and put its evidence before the Adjudicative Committee to the effect it could not and should not be accepted.

44. A bold submission that an affirmative defence should be rejected out of hand will seldom suffice unless the evidence is plainly not creditable, or the excuse offered is clearly not reasonable. That was not the case here.

45. Given the nature of the charge and the potential penalties available, we are of the view, based solely on the affirmative defence which was supported by evidence from the Appellant, the Respondent has not discharged its obligation to disprove the evidence given by the Appellant and therefore has not proved the Appellant acted wilfully in failing to provide a urine sample by 10.30am.

46. This should not be seen as diminishing the importance of the drug testing regime in any way. These were exceptional circumstances, where the Appellant was left to handle an extremely volatile and flighty horse and a failure by him to do so, could cause the animal serious harm and any of his staff who tried to intervene. He maintains (and there was no evidence otherwise) he was the only person able to do so and supporting evidence was given by the Veterinary Surgeon, as to the nature of this horse.

47. It is clear that after attending to the horse, the Appellant should have contacted the Senior Investigator Mr Carr and explained the situation to him, and returned to Matamata and attempted to be tested, albeit after 10.30am. Even if he had done this, he still technically would have breached the Rule, because he had to provide a sample by 10.30am. But if he had done so, this would have suggested that his actions were genuine. If his reason for not providing the sample was valid and he tested negatively, then there would not have been any breach of the Rule.

48. The Appellant was only 30 at the time, and he says he dealt with it badly, realised he’d failed to comply within a certain timeframe, and buried his head in the sand. He said he’s learnt his lesson. The Tribunal hopes he has learnt his lesson and notes he has been disqualified for some period now, which has been a form of punishment. It will no doubt prove to be a significant salutary reminder of the need to take steps to comply with the orders, or, if that is not possible, remediate them and explain straight away why they could not take place as requested.

Decision

1. For these reasons, we are of the view the Informant did not prove to the necessary standard, the Appellant acted wilfully in failing to provide a sample in time and therefore, the Appeal is allowed. Accordingly, the finding of guilt and the penalty imposed by the Adjudicative Committee are quashed.