Non Raceday Inquiry – Written Decision dated 13 November 2026 – Jack Johnson

ID: RIB64844

Respondent(s):
Jack Johnson - Other (Licensed Person)

Applicant:
Mr Simon Irving, Senior Racing Investigator

Chair Adjudicator:
Geoff Hall

Panel Members:
Russell McKenzie

Adjudicators:
Prof G Hall (Chair) and Mr R McKenzie

Information Number:
A19870

Decision Type:
Non-race Related Charge

Charge:
Prohibited substance - Cocaine and MDMA

Rule(s):
LR19C(2) - Prohibited substance - Produced hair sample that contained a Class A controlled drug namely Cocaine, and a Class B contolled drug, namely MDMA.

Plea:
Not Admitted

Code:
Greyhound

Hearing Date:
23/07/2026

Hearing Location:
Addington Raceway, Christchurch

Outcome: Proved

  1. Mr Johnson faces one charge pursuant to r LR19C of the New Zealand Greyhound Rules of Racing (Rules).
  2. Information A19870 states: “On the 23rd of January 2026 in Hamilton, Licensed Trainer Jack Johnson, having been required by a Racing Investigator to supply a sample of hair in accordance with Rule LR19C(1) of the NZGRA Rules, provided hair which upon analysis was found to contain the Class A controlled drug cocaine and the Class B controlled drug MDMA, as defined in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, being an offence under Rule LR19C(2) and liable to the penalty imposed pursuant to Rule 174(1) of the rules.
  3. ”Rule LR19C provides:
    “(1) Where the Racing Integrity Board has cause to suspect a registered person has used any Class A controlled drug or any Class B controlled drug as defined in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 the Racing Integrity Board may require the person to supply a hair and/or urine sample, and the registered person must comply with such a requirement.
    (2) A sample supplied by a registered person under subrule (1) must not contain any Class A controlled drug or any Class B controlled drug as defined in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 and/or its metabolites, artefacts or isomers.”
  4. Ms Middlewood faces three charges under the Rules.
  5. Information A19866 states: “On the 11th of December 2025 at Addington Raceway, Belinda Middlewood, licensed trainer of the greyhound ‘Kaitoa’, failed to produce the greyhound in race 14 of the Christchurch GRC meeting, free of the permanently banned prohibited substance, benzoylecgonine (cocaine metabolite), being an offence under the provisions of Rule 139(3) and punishable pursuant to Rule 174(1) of the NZGRA Rules.”
  6. Information A19867 states: On the 12th of January 2026 at Addington Raceway, Belinda Middlewood, licensed trainer of the greyhound ‘Wow Wow’, failed to produce the greyhound in race 6 of the Christchurch GRC meeting, free of the permanently banned prohibited substance, benzoylecgonine (cocaine metabolite), being an offence under the provisions of Rule 139(3) and punishable pursuant to Rule 174(1) of the NZGRA Rules.
  7. Information A19868 states: “On the 23rd of January 2026 in Christchurch, Licensed Trainer Belinda Middlewood, having been required by a Racing Investigator to supply a sample of hair in accordance with Rule LR19C(1) of the NZGRA Rules, provided hair which upon analysis was found to contain cocaine, being a Class A controlled drug as defined in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, being an offence under Rule LR19C(2) and liable to the penalty imposed pursuant to Rule 174(1) of the rules.”
  8. Rule 139(1) of the GRNZ Rules provides:
    “The following prohibited substances, or any metabolite, isomer or artefact of any of them are deemed to be permanently banned prohibited substances:
    (g) diacetylmorphine (heroin), benzoylmethylecgonine (cocaine), cannabinoids and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), gammahydroxybutyric acid (GHB) and its salts and amphetamines including amphetamine, methylamphetamine and methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA).”
  9. Rule 139(3) provides:
    “When a sample taken from a greyhound being trained by a trainer or in the care of a registered person has been established to contain a permanently banned prohibited substance:
    (a) the trainer and any other person who was in charge of the relevant greyhound at the relevant time shall be guilty of an offence;
    (b) the greyhound shall be disqualified from any Event or any benefit derived from a trial or test for which it was nominated at the time the sample was taken;”
  10. The penalty provision is r 174(1) which states:
    “An Adjudicative Committee may as it thinks fit penalise a person found guilty of an offence under the Rules by any one or a combination of the following penalties:
    (a) a reprimand (sometimes known as a warning or caution);
    (b) a fine not exceeding $10,000 for any one offence …;
    (c) suspension;
    (d) disqualification;
    (e) cancellation of a registration or a licence …; or
    (f) warning off.”
  11. Clause 3.3 of the Third Schedule of the GRNZ Rules provides that the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The Committee also has regard to the well-established principles regarding the application of this standard of proof in a professional disciplinary context which are set out by the Court of Appeal in Z v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee [2009] 1 NZLR 1. The Committee further observes that this standard should be applied flexibly according to the seriousness of matters to be proved and the consequences of proving them.
  12. A statement of agreed facts dated 6 July 2026 was filed with the Committee.
  13. With the agreement of both Respondents, the charges were heard at a joint hearing at Addington Raceway, Christchurch on 23 July.
  14. The Informant presented its case. Two witnesses, Dr Andrew Grierson, Veterinarian, and Mr Simon Irving, Racing Investigator, were called and were cross-examined. An amended written statement from Mr Irving and the position description of his role of Principal Investigator at the RIB was provided subsequent to the hearing, as was an evidential statement from Ms Sue Morrish, the RIB swabbing official who obtained urine samples at Addington Raceway from Kaitoa on 11 December 2025, from Ultra Instinct on 22 December 2025, and from Wow Wow on 12 January 2026.
  15. The Respondents presented its defence by way of a written memorandum dated 3 August.
  16. The Informant responded on 10 August, and the Respondents responded to these submissions on 14 August.
  17. The Adjudicative Committee observed that neither party had referred to s 44(3) of the Racing Industry Act and on 7 September called for and received further submissions addressing this issue.
  18. The greyhound Industry closed in New Zealand not long after the hearing of this matter (as from 1 August 2026).
  19. Clause 33 of Schedule 1 of the Racing Industry Act 2020 provides that the Rules continue in force during the transitional period and we can still perform our functions under the Act.
  20. Clause 10(1) of the Racing Industry (Racing Integrity Board) Regulations 2021 which was referred to in the parties’ submissions provides:
    “(1) The Board may in writing, either generally or specifically, delegate any of its functions and powers to any of its members, committees, or employees.”
  21. Also relevant is s 44 of the Racing Industry Act 2020 which is reproduced in full:
    “44 Functions and powers of Board
    (1) The functions of the Board are—
    Compliance
    (a) to employ and train stipendiary stewards and racing investigators to perform and exercise the functions, duties, and powers in each code’s racing rules:
    (b) to provide, or arrange for the provision of, veterinary services in relation to racing conducted by each racing code as required by the code’s racing rules:
    (c) to provide, or arrange for the provision of, alcohol, drug, and prohibited substances testing in relation to racing conducted by each racing code as required by the code’s racing rules:
    (d) to support and monitor the operation and effectiveness of each racing code’s animal welfare policies and initiatives:
    Adjudication
    (e) to appoint adjudicative committees to hear and adjudicate on any matters (whether arising on a particular day of racing or otherwise) in accordance with racing rules and to impose penalties and award costs in accordance with those rules:
    (f) to appoint appeals tribunals to hear and adjudicate on appeals (including penalties imposed or costs awarded):
    Other
    (g) to recommend to the racing codes any amendments to racing rules that the Board considers necessary or desirable for the purpose of supporting the racing integrity system:
    (h) to recommend to TAB NZ any amendments to betting rules that the Board considers necessary or desirable for the purpose of supporting the racing integrity system:
    (i) to initiate, develop, and recommend to the recognised industry organisations those measures that will, in the Board’s opinion, be conducive to the efficient and effective judicial control of New Zealand racing:
    (j) to monitor the operation and effectiveness of the racing integrity system on an ongoing basis and to report to the Minister as required on the outcome of that monitoring:
    (k) to provide any other services to a racing code agreed between the Board and the code or required by the code’s racing rules:
    (l) to carry out any other functions necessary or desirable to assist the Board in achieving its objectives.
    (2) The Board must ensure, as appropriate, that its compliance functions and adjudication functions are performed independently of each other.
    (3) The Board, and any persons employed or appointed by the Board to carry out its functions, have and may exercise all the powers that may be reasonably necessary for the purposes of carrying out those functions.”
    Statement of agreed facts
    The Respondents
  22. The respondent Jack Johnson (Mr Johnson) was until 5 February 2026 the holder of a Public Trainer licence issued by the New Zealand Greyhound Racing Association (NZGRA). Mr Johnson’s licence was withdrawn on that date pending determination of this matter.
  23. Prior to withdrawal of his licence, Mr Johnson trained in partnership with Matt Roberts (Mr Roberts), operating out of kennels at 1661 West Coast Road, Kirwee, Canterbury.
  24. The respondent Belinda Middlewood (Ms Middlewood) was until 3 February 2026 the holder of a Public Trainer licence issued by the NZGRA. Ms Middlewood’s licence was withdrawn on that date pending determination of this matter.
  25. Prior to withdrawal of her licence, Ms Middlewood operated a small kennel out of her home property at 255 Ashbys Road, Sefton, North Canterbury, training 6-7 racing greyhounds.
  26. Ms Middlewood is Mr Johnson’s mother.
    Cocaine and Benzoylecgonine
  27. Cocaine is a permanently prohibited substance under r 137(a)(ii) and 137(b)(lvii) of the New Zealand Greyhound Rules of Racing (the Rules). Cocaine is primarily excreted in urine as benzoylecgonine, which is the major metabolite of cocaine. Benzoylecgonine is also a permanently prohibited substance under r 137(c) of the Rules.
    Kaitoa
  28. The greyhound Kaitoa was trained by Ms Middlewood.
  29. On 11 December 2025 Kaitoa raced at Addington. A urine swab was taken from Kaitoa by RIB Swabbing Official Sue Morrish (Ms Morrish) on 11 December 2025 at 8.05pm. This was witnessed by Ms Middlewood. The details of the swab were recorded by Ms Morrish on an RIB Sample Identity Record as sample 212305. The sample was packed and sealed in front of Ms Middlewood in security bag number 0170754 and placed in the fridge.
  30. Later that day, Stipendiary Steward Richard Quirk (Mr Quirk) collected security bag 0170754, which contained sample 212305. On 15 December 2025, Mr Quirk delivered a courier bag containing the swab to an NZ Post depot to be couriered to the laboratory operated by New Zealand Racing Laboratory Services Ltd (NZRLS).
  31. On 31 December 2025, NZRLS issued a Certificate of Analysis recording that sample 212305 was positive to benzoylecgonine, the major metabolite of cocaine.
  32. On 6 January 2026, Racing Investigator Simon Irving (Racing Investigator Irving) interviewed Ms Middlewood about the positive result from Kaitoa. Ms Middlewood stated that she had used cocaine socially in the past and had consumed cocaine in December 2025 but stated that she had not used cocaine at her property.
  33. A clearance sample was taken from Kaitoa on 12 January 2026 at Addington as required by the Rules. A clearance sample is taken because a greyhound is ineligible to be nominated for any further event having tested positive to a permanently banned prohibited substance until it has provided a negative sample.
  34. On 19 January 2026, NZRLS advised Racing Investigator Irving that the clearance sample taken from Kaitoa had screened positive to benzoylecgonine.
  35. On 21 January 2026, Racing Investigator Irving spoke to Ms Middlewood about the clearance sample. Mr Irving advised Ms Middlewood that he would be serving her a direction to provide a hair sample.
  36. On 21 January 2026 a second clearance sample was taken from Kaitoa at Ms Middlewood’s kennels. The sample screened positive to benzoylecgonine.
  37. On 22 January 2026, Racing Analytical Services Ltd (RASL) issued a Certificate of Analysis stating that the B-sample of sample 212305 had been shown to contain benzoylecgonine.
  38. On 5 February 2026, a third clearance sample was taken from Kaitoa at Ms Middlewood’s kennels. The sample screened positive to benzoylecgonine.
  39. On 26 February 2026, a fourth clearance sample was taken from Kaitoa at Ms Middlewood’s kennels. The sample screened negative to prohibited substances.
    Wow Wow
  40. The greyhound Wow Wow was trained by Ms Middlewood.
  41. A urine swab was taken from Wow Wow by Ms Morrish at 5.48pm on 12 January 2026 at Addington. This was witnessed by Ms Middlewood. The details of the swab were recorded by Ms Morrish on an RIB Sample Identity Record as sample 212467. The sample was packed and sealed in front of Ms Middlewood in security bag number 0178266.
  42. At the conclusion of the meeting on 12 January 2026, Chief Greyhound Steward Scott Wallis (Mr Wallis) collected security bag number 0178266, which contained sample 212467. On 13 January 2026, Mr Wallis delivered the courier bag to the NZ Post depot to be couriered to the NZRLS laboratory.
  43. On 29 January 2026, NZRLS issued a Certificate of Analysis recording that the swab taken from Wow Wow had tested positive to benzoylecgonine.
  44. On 5 February 2026 a clearance sample was taken from Wow Wow at Ms Middlewood’s kennels. The sample screened positive to benzoylecgonine.
  45. On 25 February 2026, RASL issued a Certificate of Analysis stating that the B-sample of sample 212467 had been shown to contain benzoylecgonine.
  46. On 26 February 2026 a further clearance sample was taken from Wow Wow at Ms Middlewood’s kennels. The sample screened negative to prohibited substances.
    Ultra Instinct
  47. The greyhound Ultra Instinct was trained by the partnership of Jack Johnson and Matt Roberts.
  48. On 22 December 2025 Ultra Instinct raced at Addington. A urine swab was taken from Ultra Instinct by Ms Morrish at 3.45pm. This was witnessed by Mr Johnson.
  49. The details of the swab were recorded on an RIB Sample Identity Record as sample 222745. Ms Morrish recorded on the swab card for sample 222745 “sawdust in sample”. Ms Morrish did this because as she was pouring the urine from the ladle into the pottles, she noticed what appeared to be sawdust or similar debris in the urine. It is possible that sawdust had been blown into the ladle by the wind. Mr Johnson initialled this note and signed the Sample Identity Record.
  50. On 14 January 2026, NZRLS issued a Certificate of Analysis recording that the swab taken from Ultra Instinct was positive to benzoylecgonine.
  51. Mr Roberts was interviewed on 21 January 2026 about the positive swab taken from Ultra Instinct. Mr Roberts denied ever using cocaine.
  52. Mr Roberts’ partner Sarah Clausen (Ms Clausen) was also interviewed on 21 January 2026. Ms Clausen denied ever using cocaine.
  53. On 21 January 2026 a clearance sample was taken from Ultra Instinct. The sample screened negative to prohibited substances.
  54. On 21 January 2026, Racing Investigator Irving spoke to Mr Johnson by telephone about the positive sample from Ultra Instinct.
  55. On 23 January 2026, RASL issued a Certificate of Analysis stating that the B-sample of sample 222745 had been shown to contain benzoylecgonine. The RASL report recorded that there was a “small foreign object in urine bottle”.
    Addington Raceway
  56. On 20 January 2026, Racing Investigator Irving took four samples of sawdust from the empty out area at Addington and sent the samples to NZRLS to be analysed for the presence of cocaine.
  57. On 27 January 2026, NZRLS advised Racing Investigator Irving that the four samples were negative to prohibited substances including cocaine and benzoylecgonine.
    Hair samples
  58. On 21 January 2026, Racing Investigator Irving served Drug Testing Notification Directions on Mr Roberts, Ms Clausen, Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood. These each directed the individuals to provide a hair sample at an authorised ‘The Drug Detection Agency’ (TDDA) facility pursuant to r LR19C of the Rules.
  59. On 22 January 2026 Mr Roberts provided a 3.8cm sample of head hair at a TDDA facility.
  60. On 22 January 2026 Ms Clausen provided a 3.8cm sample of head hair at a TDDA facility.
  61. On 23 January 2026 Mr Johnson provided a 3.8cm sample of head hair at a TDDA facility. This sample was collected by testing technician Caroline Icke, who cut approximately four hair samples from the back and two hair samples from each side of Mr Johnson’s head. Each sample was cut as close as possible to Mr Johnson’s scalp.
  62. On 23 January 2026 Ms Middlewood provided a 3.8cm sample of head hair at a TDDA facility. This sample was collected by testing technician Andrew Marshall, who cut approximately four hair samples from the back and two hair samples from each side of Ms Middlewood’s head. Each sample was cut as close as possible to Ms Middlewood’s scalp.
  63. On 2 February 2026, Omega Laboratories issued a certificate recording that Ms Middlewood’s hair sample had returned a positive result to cocaine and its metabolites at a level of 4,803 pg/mg. The screening threshold for cocaine is 500pg/mg.
  64. On 4 February 2026, Omega Laboratories issued a certificate recording that Mr Johnson’s hair sample had returned a positive result to cocaine and its metabolites at a level of 5,676 pg/mg; and MDMA (ecstasy) at a level of 4,014pg/mg. The screening threshold for both cocaine and ecstasy is 500pg/mg.
  65. On 13 February 2026, Mr Johnson was interviewed about the swab taken from Ultra Instinct and about his hair sample. Racing Investigator Irving explained that the hair sample test only showed that the donor had consumed drugs in the last three months and did not identify from that period when the usage occurred.
    Mr Johnson accepted having used cocaine but said that he does not do so often and when he does, he takes a fair amount not a crazy amount. Mr Johnson stated that he has never done cocaine on working or race days but has when he has time off such as going to festivals, including on New Years Eve on 31 December 2025 at the Rolling Meadows festival that was held at 240 Lower Styx Road, Bottle Lake, Christchurch, approximately 40 kilometres away from his workplace at Kirwee. Mr Johnson also stated that he had taken three ecstasy pills containing MDMA at the Rolling Meadows festival. He maintained that he has never been reckless by consuming drugs on days he was working.
    Informant’s case
  66. The Informant stated that for the charges under r LR19C, the RIB must prove: the respondent was a licensed person or otherwise a person to whom the Rules applied; a Racing Investigator required the Respondent to supply a sample of hair in accordance with r LR19C(1); the Respondent supplied a hair sample in response to that requirement; and analysis of that sample established the presence of a controlled drug.
  67. For the charges under r 139(3), the RIB must prove: the greyhound was, at the relevant time, trained by Ms Middlewood or was in her care as a registered person; a sample was taken from that greyhound; and analysis of the sample established that it contained a permanently banned prohibited substance.
  68. In addition to the agreed statement of facts, the Informant called viva voce evidence from two witnesses: Veterinarian, Dr Andrew Grierson who gave evidence by way of AVL and who also provided a letter explaining the nature of cocaine and benzoylecgonine; and Racing Investigator, Mr Simon Irving.
  69. Dr Grierson stated that cocaine (benzoylmethylecgonine) is a stimulant that belongs to the tropane alkaloid class of compounds derived from plants. Cocaine is classified as a Class A controlled drug under the Misuse of Drugs Act. He was unaware of any medicinal use of cocaine. It is not available from veterinary wholesalers. In both greyhounds and humans, cocaine is primarily excreted in urine as benzoylecgonine.
  70. Giving dogs cocaine to stimulate them is a common way of producing positive tests overseas. However, environmental contamination from passive exposure via oral, inhalation or sweat, such as through a handler with cocaine-contaminated hands or sweat, may also be a possible source. Benzoylecgonine positives in greyhounds are detectable for several days post-exposure to cocaine.
  71. Cocaine and its metabolites are prohibited under the GRNZ Rules of Racing. Rule 137(a)(ii) lists as a prohibited substance “substances capable at any time of causing either directly or indirectly an action or effect on the cardiovascular system.” Rule 137(b)(lvii) lists stimulants, and r 137(f) includes any metabolite of a stimulant as a prohibited substance. Rule 139(g) lists benzoylmethylecgonine (cocaine) as a permanently banned prohibited substance.
  72. Dr Grierson believed that a greyhound licking its coat would be a likely source of the drug. Other possibilities were direct ingestion and absorption through skin without licking. Without knowing the initial dose, he was reluctant to state how long it would take for the cocaine to metabolise as benzoylmethylecgonine.
  73. When questioned by Mr Hall, Dr Grierson agreed with him that a clean and secure swabbing area was best practice in order to prevent contamination.
  74. Mr Irving read his evidential statement. This, and the relevant documents referred to in the agreed summary of facts, were admitted in evidence as exhibits.
  75. Mr Irving was cross-examined by Mr Hall. Mr Irving stated that the swabbing of dogs post-race at Addington would take place in the designated area in front of the kennel block. If the swabbers could not get a sample they would walk the dog down the laneway to the empty out area. There was no gate and this area was open to the elements. The scent there would assist with the obtaining of a sample. The reports with respect to Kaitoa and Wow Wow did not state where the samples had been taken. There had only been sawdust in one sample, that taken from Ultra Instinct.
  76. Mr Irving agreed it was the Chairman of Stewards that would decide to collect samples at the end of each race. It would be their role to ensure the swabbing area was clean and secure.
  77. Mr Irving agreed that although sawdust had been detected in the sample, no blood sample had been taken from Ultra Instinct. He further commented that blood was only ever taken as a last resort as it was invasive.
  78. Mr Irving believed the levels of benzoylecgonine were low in each dog which suggested the source was not one of administration.
  79. With respect to the taking of the samples from Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood, Mr Irving said the RIB was concerned with safety and the risks re racing and animals. It was not concerned with private social activities. He emphasised that the RIB was immediately concerned as there had never been previous positives to benzoylecgonine. Ms Greive, Dr Eliot Forbes and himself had unanimously agreed that there was cause to suspect drug use by the individuals concerned. Kaitoa and Wow Wow were continuing to return positives. He disagreed with Mr Hall that the Board of the RIB had to form this suspicion. It was sufficient for the three of them to do so and he confirmed to Mr Hall that they had not briefed the Board of the RIB with regard to this decision.
  80. With respect to the laying of the charges, Mr Irving did not believe the authorisation of the Chief Executive Officer was required, but this was the usual practice, and it had been given on this occasion. He disagreed with Mr Hall that the Board of the RIB had to authorise the laying of the charges.
    Respondents’ submissions
  81. The Respondents’ principal submission was that the proceedings against Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood are a nullity. There was no delegation of the RIB’s power to collect the urine samples from the relevant greyhounds or hair samples from the Respondents. Nor was there any legal authority to file the Informations against the Respondents.
  82. They further submitted that Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood were not required to provide a hair sample. Their fundamental right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure under s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) was breached.
  83. The evidence against the Respondents was gathered in the course of a single transaction as a result of the improper use of the Board’s powers and a breach of their fundamental rights. It should therefore be excluded.
    The proceedings are a nullity
  84. The Respondents contended that there is a statutory requirement for the RIB’s functions and powers to be delegated in writing. Without this delegation, the decisions made to initiate the proceedings or the investigative steps taken were void ab initio.
  85. The Rules stipulate that only the Board has power to collect urine samples, require hair samples, and file informations. Regulation 10(1) expressly provides for the written delegation of the Board’s functions and powers.
  86. Section 44(1)(a) of the Racing Industry Act is not a statutory delegation in and of itself. This interpretation, which was favoured by the Informant, was strained and was wrong as it produced an absurd and illogical result that effectively ignored all other statutory provisions and the Rules. For example, there would be no need to set out the powers of Stipendiary Stewards and Racing Investigators in rr 19 and LR19B of the Rules, which circumscribe what a steward or investigator is empowered to do, nor would there be any point in legislating reg 10. This regulation would be redundant if there was already a built-in statutory delegation of power in the Act that allowed for any employee of the Board to exercise its functions and powers.
  87. Section 44 is a statutory provision that empowers the Board with various functions and powers. Properly understood, the Respondents contended, s 44(1)(a) explains that a function of the Board is to employ Stewards and Investigators to carry out the functions, duties and powers as specified under the Rules. It is not a wholesale grant allowing any employee to make any decision. If that was the case, it would be impossible without written delegation from the Board to determine which Steward’s or Investigator’s decision to exercise the Board’s functions and powers would take precedence over another Steward’s or Investigator’s decision to do the same. That was what reg 10 exists to address.
  88. Section 44(3) merely confirms that the power of any person appointed by the Board to carry out specific functions assigned to them to do whatever is reasonably necessary to carry out those functions. It does not specify the functions of each employee or appointee.
  89. It followed that the Rules provide the scope of what a Steward or Racing Investigator could do. This was confirmed by s 37(5)(a) of the Act. It would be nonsensical for Parliament to have enacted reg 10 only for s 44(1)(a) or (3) to become a statutory authority for any employee or appointee to exercise any Board function or power. It would be highly unusual for a statutory body to have automatically relinquished its functions and powers to its employees and appointees with no specified details or constraints.
  90. Mr Irving’s evidence that in his view, as an employee of the Board, he was permitted to carry out the Board’s functions and powers as he considered appropriate without express delegation was wrong. This, Mr Irving believed, was implied by the use in the Act of the words RIB. He did not agree with Mr Hall that the RIB itself had to have cause to suspect drug use. Whether this suspicion was present had been discussed by himself, Dr Eliot Forbes and Ms Greive, who were all employees of the Board.
  91. The Respondents emphasised that delegation had not occurred, nor did Mr Irving or other employees take any steps to obtain written delegation. In these circumstances, the Respondents contended, there was nothing in the Act or the Rules for Mr Irving and others to show that they were employed or appointed to carry out the Board’s functions and powers in rr LR19C, 136 (testing and collecting of samples) and LR173A (filing of informations).
  92. The Respondents submitted that the Committee should apply Solicitor-General’s Reference (No 1 of 2024) [2025] NZSC 121, [20251 1 NZLR 459. In that case the Supreme Court held that the failure to obtain the Attorney-General’s consent to bring the charge as required under legislation rendered the resulting trial and convictions a nullity, notwithstanding the significant practical consequences of that finding. This was no mere technicality or administrative error as the Attorney-General’s consent was a statutory pre-requisite that needed to be satisfied to commence the prosecution. The same applied in the Respondents’ case. The failure to abide by reg 10 meant that the proceedings were a nullity as no employee of the Board was permitted to exercise the powers that led up to and brought the proceedings against the Respondents.
  93. The Board’s powers and functions in relation to raceday testing were also questioned. Mr Hall submitted that there was no evidence that the Board had delegated in writing its power to test a particular greyhound under r 136(1) to the Chairman of Stewards. It was either GRNZ or the Board that may “carry out or cause to be carried out any test … they may think necessary in relation to a greyhound at any time….” Furthermore, the position Chairman of Stewards did not exist in the Rules (rr 9 and 136). This led the Respondents to submit that the decision of the Chairman of Stewards to collect a sample from greyhounds Kaitoa, Wow Wow, and Ultra Instinct was null and void.
  94. The Respondents further submitted that there was no authority to require a hair sample from them as the decision to require Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood to provide a hair sample was not made by the Board, nor was it delegated to anyone in writing. The decision made by Mr Irving, legal executive manager, Raquel Greive, and chief executive of the Board, Dr Eliot Forbes, was void as they are not members of the Board. Rather, they are employees of the Board.
  95. Mr Hall stated it appeared that Mr Irving, Ms Greive and Dr Forbes were operating under the previous Rules dated 6 April 2022 under which a Steward or an Investigator under r 62.4(a) and (b) could require a licensed person to provide a hair sample. But under the current Rules, only the Board or a person it has delegated to in writing can make such decisions.
  96.  With respect to the filing of the Informations, the Board had not come to its own view that there was reasonable cause to believe that the alleged offences had been committed by the Respondents before the Informations were filed against them. Nor did it delegate its powers under r 173A(1) and (3) to another person in writing. Rather, as set out in the authority to charge documents, Mr Irving, Ms Greive and Dr Forbes on their own accord decided to file the informations against the Respondents. These persons are not members of the Board. Nor are they collectively or individually the Executive Officer of the Adjudicative Committee who is the only person authorised to file the Information on behalf of the Board under r LR173A(2) and (4).
  97. The filing of the Informations by persons other than the Executive Officer of the Adjudicative Committee was contrary to s 44(2) of the Racing Industry Act, which provides that the Board “must ensure, as appropriate, that its compliance functions and adjudication functions are performed independently of each other.” It is therefore inappropriate that the Informations were filed based on the decisions of an Investigator, in-house legal counsel and the chief executive of the Board, all of whom form a part of the Board’s compliance function as opposed to the adjudication function.
  98. The conclusion, the Respondents said, was there was no authority, delegated or otherwise, to file the Informations against Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood. The charges and the proceeding that followed were therefore nullities.
    The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
  99. With respect to the provision of hair samples, the Respondents submitted they were not required give a hair sample under r LR19C.
  100. The Supreme Court decision in Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] NZSC 46 established that the power in the Rules requiring the provision of bodily samples, which constituted a search, was subject to the right to be secure against unreasonable search.
  101. The Court also held that the Rules permitting the search needed to be read purposively in line with s 29 of the Racing Act 2003 (now repealed by the Racing Industry Act 2020) which provided for the promulgation of Rules regulating “the conduct of racing”, including the management of safety at race meetings. Ms Cropp’s appeal was unsuccessful in that testing was a necessary and lawful deterrent to ensure the safety of horses and jockeys, given the consumption of drugs would enhance the dangers inherent in horse racing. The safety of participants at race meetings was a purpose for which the power requiring testing could be reasonably and lawfully exercised.
  102. In Cropp, the danger of a jockey racing under the influence of methamphetamine was self-evident and did not require expert evidence to establish. The Respondents submitted the same could not be said for them. The assumption that had to be made from the Informant’s submission was that either a trainer deliberately contaminated the greyhounds or inadvertently transferred illicit substances into its system through the ordinary course of handling the animal in a quantity sufficient to produce a positive urine result. No evidence established that. While Dr Grierson noted that inadvertent transferal was a possibility, the Respondents emphasised that Dr Grierson’s expertise was in equine veterinary surgery, as opposed to greyhounds.
  103. Applying Cropp, the power to conduct a search under r LR19C was permissible only if the search was reasonably necessary to preserve the individual’s right to be secure against unreasonable seizure and to regulate the conduct of racing. This was the purpose for which the Rules were promulgated pursuant to s 37 of the Racing Industry Act.
  104. The fact that the Respondents consented to the provision of hair samples did not excuse an unreasonable search or seizure. Their consent was not fully informed. They did not know that the power in r LR19C could only be exercised by the Board or its delegate. The fact that the drug testing notification letters signed by Mr Irving incorrectly asserted that “the RIB has cause to suspect you have used the drug cocaine” was misleading. Mr Irving’s assertions that he is a “part” of the Board and could therefore act in its capacity without written authority permitting the delegation of power was wrong.
    Mr Johnson
  105. Mr Hall stated that prior to to Mr Johnson’s statement on 13 February that he had used cocaine at a music festival between 31 December 2025 and 1 January 2026 and on 10 January 2026 at a 21st birthday party, there was no basis, let alone a reasonable one, to search him by way of testing a sample of his hair to regulate the conduct of any race.
  106. Mr Johnson provided a hair sample on account of the fact that Ultra Instinct tested positive for the cocaine metabolite benzoylecgonine. However, the sample taken from Ultra Instinct was contaminated with sawdust through no fault of Mr Johnson. Whether the sawdust of Ultra Instinct’s urine was the source of the benzoylecgonine was unclear — the sawdust could have been contaminated, as opposed to the urine, given the empty-out area where the sawdust was in is an open, publicly accessible and unclean space that is frequented by various persons and animals.
  107. That the entire area designated to take samples from greyhounds at Addington Raceway, including the empty-out area, is open to the public was confirmed by Mr Irving in his evidence. This environment is contrary to what Dr Grierson considered is best practice. He said in evidence that testing grounds need to be in a sheltered area that is closed to the public to avoid the risk of contamination.
  108. Although the contaminated sample resulted in the withdrawal of the presentation charge, it was still a factor and was relied upon in the flawed and unlawful decision to require a sample of Mr Johnson’s hair. The Committee viewed the swabbing area. It could not be contended that it was clean and fit for swabbing purposes. The public have access to it day and night and it could be a high foot-traffic area when events were held nearby. The risk of contamination from humans and animals was high. Even the so-called designated area was always open to the public and the elements. It was not secured or monitored when not in use. The swabbing area was not fit for purpose and was far from being compliant with swabbing protocols and best practice.
  109. Mr Irving in his evidence conceded that area where Ultra Instinct’s sample was taken was not sterile. He was also unsure if the sawdust there had been replenished, if at all, over the relevant time.
  110. One of the factors that informed Mr Irving’s belief that there was cause to suspect that Mr Johnson had used cocaine was the fact that “Belinda stated that Jack had used illicit drugs with her in the past, although she did not think he would use cocaine.” This did not accurately reflect what Ms Middlewood actually said in her interview transcript. She said:
    “I wouldn’t imagine that Jack would use coke…. He doesn’t smoke, doesn’t smoke pot or anything so I don’t know. Kids do the MDMA, it’s pretty popular…. I can tell you right now Jack is no good with acid and he will never have acid again as long as he lives but at least he was sensible enough to it at home and we could keep a lid on it. He didn’t ask me about trying anything else, he hasn’t told me he wants to try anything else. We’re very close and very open about stuff like that.”
  111. Mr Hall contended that there was nothing in Ms Middlewood’s statement could have reasonably suggested that Mr Johnson had consumed cocaine.
  112. There were considerably fewer safety concerns in relation to greyhound racing and the use of illicit substances in comparison to horse racing. All greyhounds must wear a muzzle while on the racecourse. The risk to the safety of greyhounds participating in a race was adequately mitigated further by taking a urine sample from the greyhounds to deter against the use of drugs to enhance performance.
  113. Requiring Mr Johnson to submit a hair sample for testing was therefore an unreasonable search in breach of his right under s 21 of the NZBORA.
    Ms Middlewood
  114. Ms Middlewood was candid in her interview with Mr Irving. She said she had consumed some cocaine in December 2025 during social events away from her dogs and her property but did not remember when exactly those events had occurred.
  115. A purposive interpretation of the Rules, Mr Hall submitted, would require searching Ms Middlewood only if it was reasonably necessary to “regulate the conduct of racing”. Her consumption of cocaine was limited to her personal use for a short period in December 2025. There was no suggestion that she had consumed cocaine near her dogs. She had maintained a blemish-free record for over six years since she became a Licensed Public Trainer in 2019.
  116. Ms Middlewood told Mr Irving that she had consumed cocaine, MDMA and acid in the last six months, none of which were found in any of her dogs’ urine samples prior to Kaitoa testing positive for benzoylecgonine in December 2025.
  117. There was ample evidence that the swabbing area that includes the designated area and the empty-out area were unclean and fell well below the expected standards.
  118. Mr Hall submitted that no swabs taken from Ms Middlewood’s dogs Kaitoa and Wow Wow should be admissible evidence in support of the charges brought against her. The evidence of the swabs was improperly and unfairly obtained.
  119. Mr Hall reiterated there were considerably fewer safety concerns arising from greyhound racing and the use of illicit substances to enhance performance in comparison to horse racing. The risks to the safety of greyhounds from being exposed to illicit substances was adequately mitigated by collecting urine samples from select greyhounds before or after a race.
  120. Requiring Ms Middlewood to submit a hair sample for testing was therefore an unreasonable search in breach of s 21 of the NZBORA.
    Conclusion
  121. The Respondents stated in conclusion that the unauthorised and wanton use of the Board’s powers rendering the proceedings a nullity and the breach of the Respondents’ right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure were all grave improprieties that warranted the exclusion of the evidence obtained against them. Mr Hall emphasised that the evidence was obtained in a single transaction in which the following course of events occurred:
    • the null and void decision was made to take a urine sample from greyhounds Kaitoa, Wow Wow, and Ultra Instinct;
    • the integrity of the urine samples taken was compromised given the swabbing area, including the designated area and the empty-out area, is unclean and falls well below the expected industry standards;
    • the Respondents were required to provide hair samples for testing without any written delegation from the Board and in breach of the Respondents’ rights under s 21 of the NZBORA; and
    • the decision was made with no written authority permitting the delegation from the Board to charge the Respondents and file the relevant Informations against them
  122. R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 was authority for the proposition that where the evidence is obtained in the course of a single transaction, which includes an unreasonable search, there will be a sufficient connection between the breach and the evidence for the evidence to be excluded. There was an obvious connection between the improper circumstances which included an unreasonable search, and the evidence obtained as a result. But for those improprieties, there would have been no urine or hair samples to take and test. The evidence should therefore be excluded as it was essentially “tainted”.
    Informant’s closing submissions
  123.  The Informant stated that there were effectively two issues for determination by the Committee. They were (1) whether the proceedings were a nullity, on the basis that: the Rules did not empower either the Chief Steward (the Chairman of Stewards) to authorise collection or urine samples under r 136, or Mr Irving to require the Respondents to provide hair samples under r LR19C, as there was no written delegation from the RIB to the Stewards or the Racing Investigators; and/or there was no legal authority for the charges to be filed as there was no written delegation from the RIB to Mr Irving authorising the charge to be filed under r LR173A; and (2) whether the evidence should be excluded on the basis that the requirement for Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood to provide hair samples breached their right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure under s 21 of the NZBORA.
  124. With respect to the first issue and in rejecting the Respondents’ submission that the proceedings were a nullity, the Informant contended that there is a statutory delegation in s 44(1)(a) which authorises the urine and hair samples to be collected and the charges to be filed.
  125. Citing s 10 of the Legislation Act 2019, the Informant submitted legislation is to be interpreted from its text and in light of its purpose and context, and r 8(1) contains a clear indicator from GRNZ that a purposive rather than a strict textual reading of the Rules should apply.
  126. The Informant identified rr 136(1) and 139(2) as being relevant.
  127. Rule 136(1) provides: “GRNZ or the Racing Integrity Board may carry out or cause to be carried out any test, examination or inspection they think necessary in relation to a greyhound at any time….”
  128. While r 139, which relates to permanently banned prohibited substances, states in subcl (2): “In addition to testing pursuant to rr 136(1) and 154 of these Rules, the Racing Integrity Board or an officer of GRNZ may carry out, or cause to be carried out, tests they think fit in relation to a greyhound at any time for the purposes of this rule.”
  129. Rule LR173A(1) provides: “An information may be filed against any person or greyhound in respect of any incident, matter or thing occurring, arising or taking place during the course of a meeting, by the Racing Integrity Board if it has reasonable cause to believe that an offence has been committed.”
  130. The Rules define the “Racing Integrity Board” in r 9 as “the body established pursuant to s 42 of the [Racing Industry] Act 2020.”
  131. Section 45(1) of the Racing Industry Act, headed “Board members”, states: “The [Racing Integrity] Board consists of up to 5 members appointed by the Minister….”
  132. The Informant submitted that the entity that operates under the name “the Racing Integrity Board” has two limbs: the governance arm, which consists of the Board that is comprised of a Board Chair and other members appointed by the Minister under s 45 of the Act; and the operational arm, which consists of staff employed by the Board to carry out operational functions on behalf of the Board as detailed in s 44.
  133. The Informant submitted that the Respondents’ submissions conflated the Board members of the RIB (the “Racing Integrity Board Board” as described by Mr Irving) with the operational entity that is also named the Racing Integrity Board.
  134. Section 44 of the Act sets out the functions and powers of the RIB. The Informant viewed s 44(1)(a) as providing a clear statutory delegation of functions, duties and powers given to the RIB under the Rules. The effect of s 44(1)(a) is that the Board is required by its establishing Act to employ Stipendiary Stewards and Racing Investigators to perform and exercise the functions, duties and powers in the Rules. When the Rules refer to “the Racing Integrity Board”, that must necessarily be read as a reference to Stewards and Investigators employed by the Board to perform those functions. No further written delegation under reg 10 is required.
  135. Section 44(1)(c) of the Racing Act provides that one of the functions of the RIB is to provide, or arrange for the provision of, alcohol, drug, and prohibited substances testing in relation to racing conducted by each racing code as required by the code’s racing rules. It cannot have been Parliament’s intention that the members of the Board carry out or arrange for the provision of drug testing.
  136. Section 44(3) of the Act confers powers, not functions. It provides that the RIB and any person employed by the RIB to carry out the RIB’s functions has all the powers necessary to do so; ie any person employed by the RIB to do the things that he or she is responsible for doing on behalf of the RIB can take the necessary actions to do those things – they have the powers required to carry out those functions.
  137. This interpretation, the Informant believed, is logical given the placement of s 44(3) in the section. It supplements the identification and conferment of functions under s 44(1) by also empowering the person with the function (whether the RIB or any person employed or appointed by the RIB) to do the things necessary to carry out those functions.
  138. Section 44(3) expressly confers powers on both the RIB and any person employed or appointed by the RIB. This language clearly anticipates that in addition to carrying out its own functions, the RIB will also employ other persons to carry out its functions on its behalf. This is consistent with the structure of virtually every statutory entity — the role of the Board members is a governance role, with staff members employed to carry out operational functions.
  139. The text of s 44(3) makes it clear that Parliament anticipated that the functions conferred on the RIB by statute may also be conferred on others in ways other than a written delegation under reg 10 with s 44(1)(a) being one such example. This indicates a clear intention by Parliament that the exercise of those functions, duties and powers does not require express delegation under reg 10.
  140. Section 44(3) does not refer to any person delegated by the RIB to carry out its functions. The section could have, if Parliament’s intention was as the Respondents contend – namely that functions conferred on the RIB by the Act can only be carried out by either the RIB itself as defined in the Act, or by a person duly delegated in writing under reg 10. While delegated persons are a subset of persons “appointed” by the RIB, the fact that Parliament did not confine s 44(3) to the term “delegated” indicates that it anticipated a wider ability for the RIB’s functions to be conferred on and carried out by others, including, for example by employees as provided for in s 44(1)(a) of the Act.
  141. The references in the Rules to “the Racing Integrity Board” confers powers on Racing Investigators carrying out functions on behalf of the RIB, as anticipated by s 44(1)(a) and as stipulated by s 44(3).
  142. Section 37(5)(a) of the Act provides that racing rules made pursuant to s 37(1) may provide for the functions, duties and powers of Stipendiary Stewards and Racing Investigators. The Informant submitted that if the references in the Rules were not read as empowering Racing Investigators to carry out functions on behalf of the Board, then the Rules would not comply with s 37(5)(a). An interpretation that is consistent with this section was to be preferred.
  143. The position description of Principal Investigator, which is the role Mr Irving occupies, states that he is appointed and employed by the Board to carry out compliance functions, consistent with s 44(1)(a) of the Act.
  144. The Informant further noted that if the Respondents’ interpretation of the Rules was correct and only the Board itself was empowered to carry out functions and powers under the Rules, the practical ramifications would be immense. This would mean that the RIB had been acting wholly unlawfully in relation to the entire greyhound racing industry for three and a half years, which could not have been GRNZ’s intention in promulgating the new Rules.
  145. Solicitor-General’s Reference (No 1 of 2024) was not relevant to this case, the Informant submitted. The Act in question in that case, the Constitution Act 1986, contained an express requirement for written permission (leave) to be obtained from the Attorney-General before charges were filed. Sections 9A and 9C that Act permitted the Attorney-General to delegate this decision-making function to the Solicitor-General and Deputy Solicitor-Generals, but the necessary delegation had not been made in accordance with the requirements under that Act. The Supreme Court found that the criminal charges had been filed in contravention of the leave requirement in s 106 of the Crimes Act and were therefore a nullity. There was no express requirement in this case for written permission to be obtained before charges are filed as there was in that case.
    The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
  146. The Informant accepted that the collection of a hair sample from the Respondents constituted a search and the reasonableness of that search was therefore amenable to scrutiny for compliance with the right under s 21 of the NZBORA to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Cropp was that racing codes are, in principle, lawfully entitled to impose drug testing rules on licence holders. The question for the Committee was whether the rule authorising the particular search is reasonable in terms of s 21 of NZBORA. One of the important considerations was the Supreme Court’s finding that any such testing “must be related to racing”.
  147. The Informant acknowledged that the decision in Cropp focused on the safety of jockeys, but another important consideration that must be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of the search was animal welfare. Cropp did not engage with the risk that a jockey who was using drugs might contaminate an animal, but that was clearly a feature in the case before the Committee.
  148. The testing undertaken in the present case was “related to racing” because the persons required to provide a sample were all connected through training with greyhounds that had returned positive results for benzoylecgonine, the major metabolite of cocaine. There was a clearly available and reasonable inference that the persons who were required to provide samples may have contaminated the animals. This gave rise to animal welfare concerns and concerns for the safety of other industry participants, on the basis of both animal and human drug consumption. In these circumstances, a requirement to provide a hair sample for the purpose of drug testing was clearly not unreasonable.
  149. The extent of intrusion on the Respondents’ privacy was also relevant to assessing the reasonableness of the search. In relation to r LR19C, the extent was at the lower end as the taking of a hair sample does not involve an intrusive medical procedure (such as the use of a needle to take a blood sample) or an intrusive bodily search.
  150. The provision in r LR19C to require a respondent to provide a hair sample was therefore not inconsistent with s 21 of the NZBORA, provided the threshold criteria for that was met and the requirement was exercised in circumstances that are “related to racing”. In this case, the Informant submitted, they were.
  151. The power to require a hair sample under r LR19C is engaged if a Racing Investigator “has cause to suspect a registered person has used any Class A controlled drug or Class B controlled drug”. This threshold was met on the evidence. Mr Irving had cause to suspect that Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood had used Class A or Class B drugs.
  152. Citing R v Williams [2007] 3 NZLR 207, [2007] NZCA 52 at [213], the Informant submitted “cause to suspect” was a comparatively low threshold. In relation to the phrase “good cause to suspect” in statutes such as the Land Transport Act 1998, the courts had found that this should be interpreted the same as reasonable cause to suspect. The phrase had been interpreted to mean “no more than a reasonable ground of suspicion upon which a reasonable man may act”. The threshold is thinking that something is “possible or likely”; or “inherently likely”; or thinking that it is likely that a situation exists.
  153. The absence of the qualifier “reasonable” or “good” cause to suspect in r LR19C meant that on the sliding scale suggested by the Law Commission in its Report on Search and Surveillance Powers (NZLC R97, 2007), the likelihood that the suspected state of affairs exists must be less than “possible or likely” or “inherently likely”. There must still be some degree of suspicion that the state of affairs exists, but the threshold is low.
  154. The Informant identified the information that the Racing Investigator, Mr Irving, had from his investigation at the time the Drug Testing Notification Directions were served on Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood on 21 January 2026 (viz when they were required to give a hair sample) that led him to form the belief that there was cause to suspect the Respondents had used Class A or Class B drugs.
  155. First, Ms Middlewood:
    • Kaitoa, a greyhound that she trained and had taken to the races had tested positive to benzoylecgonine.
    • A clearance sample taken from Kaitoa had also screened positive to benzoylecgonine, indicating ongoing exposure to cocaine.
    • Ms Middlewood had stated during her interview with Mr Irving: she would have been the only person transporting Kaitoa on the relevant day; and she had used cocaine in the past few weeks.
  156. The Informant submitted that this information was clearly sufficient to entitle Mr Irving to form the belief that Kaitoa’s sample had tested positive because Ms Middlewood had used Class A drugs, including cocaine.
  157. Secondly, in relation to Mr Johnson, he had been around regularly to help his mother, Ms Middlewood, with the dogs; she did not think that Mr Johnson would have taken cocaine, but he may have taken MDMA, and he had taken other drugs at her house.
  158. Mr Irving knew that a sample taken from a greyhound trained by Mr Johnson, Ultra Instinct, had tested positive to benzoylecgonine, indicating exposure to cocaine, although Mr Irving knew that the swab card had noted sawdust in the sample so there was concern about whether the Informant could prove a presentation charge to the balance of probabilities.
  159. While there was a possibility of contamination of the sample, no decision had been made about that possibility. In these circumstances, it was a likely or plausible state of affairs that the positive result in Ultra Instinct’s sample was due to Mr Johnson having used a Class A drug. Other possibilities existed, including the possibility of contamination of the sample by the sawdust that was identified on the swab card and in the sample, but this possible state of affairs was sufficiently likely to give Mr Irving cause to suspect.
  160. The concerns raised by the Respondents about the swabbing processes did not undermine this finding. With reference to Dr Andrew Grierson’s evidence, this was of limited assistance to the Committee as he had made it clear that his expertise is in the area of equine veterinary surgery and he was not familiar with the processes for swabbing greyhounds, other than in a general sense. Despite security and possible contamination issues with the emptying out area, prior to the case before the Committee there had not been a positive detection of benzoylecgonine or cocaine in a greyhound in the history of greyhound racing in New Zealand. If the swabbing procedure gave rise to serious concerns about contamination, that absence of any previous positive results would be highly surprising.
  161. In relation to Kaitoa and Wow Wow, both dogs returned positive results to clearance samples that were taken from the dogs at Ms Middlewood’s kennels. That must eliminate the reasonable possibility of the samples having been contaminated at the empty-out area.
  162. Ms Middlewood had also admitted using cocaine in proximity to Kaitoa testing positive to benzoylecgonine. It would be a remarkable coincidence if a cocaine user happened to also be the trainer of a greyhound that was free from prohibited substances but had a sample taken from it that was environmentally contaminated with benzoylecgonine during the swabbing process.
  163. In these circumstances, the Informant submitted, any concerns about the reliability of the samples taken from the greyhounds did not undermine a finding that Mr Irving had cause to suspect that Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood had used Class A or Class B drugs at the time that he required them to provide hair samples. The requirement was therefore lawfully issued under the Rules, and the resulting evidence was admissible.
  164. As to exclusion of the evidence, the Informant noted that the Committee has a broad discretion to admit evidence pursuant to cl 17.1 of the Third Schedule of the Rules.
  165. In the criminal jurisdiction, where evidence has been improperly obtained (including obtained in breach of legislative requirements or obtained unfairly), per s 30(2)(b) of the Evidence Act the Court must determine whether or not the exclusion of the evidence is proportionate to the impropriety by means of a balancing process that gives appropriate weight to the impropriety and takes proper account of the need for an effective and credible system of justice. Relevant considerations are listed at s 30(3). While this section is not binding on the Committee, the relevant considerations provide helpful guidance. The following considerations were said to arise in the present case:
  166. Any impropriety, if found, would be at the low end. Mr Irving was clear in his evidence that he considered he had the lawful power to require the samples and that the criteria in the Rules to do so was satisfied. Any impropriety, if found, would therefore be inadvertent rather than reckless or done in bad faith. Those matters weigh in favour of admitting the evidence.
  167. The nature and quality of the evidence is undisputed analytical findings. The Respondents accept that if the evidence is admitted, it will prove the charges.
  168. The offences are moderately serious. Previous cases tend to suggest that they would attract a period of disqualification.
  169. There was a degree of urgency in obtaining the evidence, as Kaitoa and Ultra Instinct had both tested positive to benzoylecgonine and Kaitoa had screened positive again on a clearance sample, indicating ongoing exposure and a degree of urgency to ascertain the source of exposure and eliminate any risk.
  170. No alternative remedies are available.
  171. These factors all weigh in favour of admitting the evidence, having regard to the importance of the prohibited substances testing regime.
    Conclusion
  172. None of the matters raised by the Respondents mean that the evidence should be excluded. The evidence in the agreed facts document is, if admitted, sufficient to prove all of the charges. The Committee should find the charges proved.
    Discussion
  173. We agree with the parties that in essence there are two key issues to be determined by this Adjudicative Committee: (1) Are the charges a nullity; and (2) Has there been a breach of the NZBORA.
  174. We deal with each in turn.
    The charges are a nullity
  175. This issue requires an appraisal of the Racing Industry Act 2020, the Racing Industry (Racing Integrity Board) Regulations 2021 and the GRNZ Rules of Racing.
  176. The relationship between s 44(1)(a) and (3) of the Racing Industry Act and reg 10 of the Racing Industry (Racing Integrity Board) Regulations has formed the foundation of the parties’ submissions as to whether the charges against both Respondents are nullities.
  177. The RIB is a creature of statute and is established by s 42 of the Racing Industry Act. Section 43 details the objectives of the Board. Not surprisingly, the first objective is to promote, and ensure compliance with, high standards of animal welfare. Further objectives are to promote, and ensure compliance with, integrity, and professionalism by participants in the racing industry for the benefit of the public, participants, and the racing industry as a whole. We believe this emphasis on animal welfare is significant as such concerns feature prominently in this case.
  178. Section 44 of the Act sets out the functions and powers of the RIB.
  179. Section 44(1) identifies the RIB’s functions. Section 44(1)(a) states that one of the RIB’s functions is to employ Stipendiary Stewards and Racing Investigators to perform and exercise the functions, duties and powers in each code’s racing rules. Section 44(1)(c) identifies a further function to be to provide, or arrange for the provision of, alcohol, drug, and prohibited substances testing in relation to racing conducted by each racing code as required by the code’s racing rules. Subsection (3) of s 44 provides that the Board, and any persons employed or appointed by the Board to carry out its functions, have and may exercise all powers that may be reasonably necessary for the purposes of carrying out those functions. This subsection thus expressly confers powers on both the RIB and any person employed or appointed by the RIB to perform the Board’s functions.
  180. The principal issue is whether s 44(1)(a) is a statutory delegation that enables the RIB to employ Racing Investigators and Stipendiary Stewards to perform and exercise the functions, duties and powers given to the RIB under the Rules.
  181. The Informant states that it is; whereas the Respondents submit that there is a legislative requirement for the RIB’s functions and powers to delegated in writing. This is based on the fact that reg 10 of the Racing Industry (Racing Integrity Board) Regulations states that the Board may in writing, either generally or specifically, delegate any of its functions and powers to any of its members, committees, or employees.
  182. It follows, the Respondents submit, that there must be a written delegation in accordance with reg 10 and the Informant has not put before this Committee any evidence of any written delegation. The charges are therefore a nullity.
  183. Section 10 of the Legislation Act 2019 provides that the meaning of legislation must be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose and its context. In addition, r 8(1) of the GRNZ Rules states that an interpretation of the Rules that “promotes or achieves the apparent purpose of a rule, in the context of the Rules as a whole, is to apply.” Thus a purposive rather than a strict textual approach when interpreting the Rules is appropriate.
  184. We do not accept the Respondents’ submission that each reference in the Act and the Rules to the RIB is to the RIB Board (as explained below at [191]).
  185. We are satisfied that s 44(1)(a) empowers the RIB to employ Mr Irving (and other Racing Investigators) to perform and exercise the functions, duties, and powers in the GRNZ Rules. A function of the RIB under subs (1)(c) is to provide, or arrange for the provision of, alcohol, drug, and prohibited substances testing, while subs (3) expressly enables the Board, and any persons employed by the Board (eg Mr Irving) to carry out its functions, to exercise all powers that may be reasonably necessary for the purposes of carrying out those functions. Mr Irving is employed by the Board as a Racing Investigator, indeed we understand he currently holds the position of Principal Racing Investigator.
  186. The authority to collect the samples and file the Informations is found in s 44 of the Act. This section gives Investigators the authority to exercise their functions and powers without needing a further and separate written delegation under reg 10.
  187. We do not believe that reg 10, which is expressed in permissive terms, runs counter to or contradicts this interpretation of s 44. Indeed one way of viewing the operation of s 44 and reg 10 is that there is an adoption of a belt and braces approach in anticipation of the various contingencies that may arise. The two provisions operate alongside each other. Neither operates to the exclusion of the other.
  188. For example, reg 10 is broader in scope than is s 44, in that it provides not only for written delegation of any of its functions and powers to employees but also to any of its members or committees. Thus, we do not accept the Respondents’ submission that to interpret the Act in the manner that we have has the effect of making reg 10 redundant.
  189. Additionally, viewed his way, rr 19 and LR19B, for example, simply describe in further detail (prescribe) what a Stipendiary Steward or Racing Investigator is empowered to do when fulfilling their functions and exercising the powers conferred upon them by s 44 of the Act. This is in accordance with s 37(5)(a) of the Act which states that racing rules may provide for the functions, duties, and powers of Stipendiary Stewards and Racing Investigators.
  190. While we accept there was no written delegation of the RIB’s power to collect the urine samples from the relevant greyhounds or hair samples from the Respondents, or authority to file the Informations against the Respondents, we do not believe that this was necessary.
  191. When the Act is interpreted in this manner, we find that the reference to the RIB in the Racing Industry Act is to the operational entity, the Racing Integrity Board and not the Board members of the RIB (which in his evidence Mr Irving described as the “Racing Integrity Board Board” and which was subsequently adopted at the hearing as a shorthand reference by both parties) when the functions of the RIB are at issue. Reference in the Rules to the Racing Integrity Board, is to be read as a reference to Stewards and Investigators employed by the Board to perform the functions conferred upon them by s 44.
  192. Furthermore, we also see merit in the Informant’s observation that s 44(3) does not refer to any person delegated by the RIB to carry out its functions but rather any persons employed or appointed by the Board to carry out its functions. This subsection could have been so worded, were Parliament’s intention, as the Respondents contend, that functions conferred on the RIB by the Act can only be carried out by either the RIB Board, or by a person duly delegated in writing under reg 10. The fact that Parliament did not confine s 44(3) to the term “delegated” indicates that it anticipated a wider ability for the RIB’s functions to be conferred on and carried out by others, including, for example, by employees as provided for in s 44(1)(a) of the Act.
  193. The Respondents contend that s 44(1)(a) explains that a function of the Board is to employ Stewards and Investigators to carry out the functions, duties and powers as specified under the Rules. As the Informant correctly notes, the wording in the section is as specified in the Rules. This distinction, while subtle, is valid, and further supports our conclusion that the references in the Rules to the RIB gives Racing Investigators the authority to exercise their functions and powers under s 44(1)(a), as stipulated by s 44(3), without needing a separate written delegation under reg 10.
  194. We also briefly address the further related issues raised in the Respondents’ submissions.
  195. We consider the circumstances in Solicitor-General’s Reference (No 1 of 2024) [2025] NZSC 121, [2025] 1 NZLR 459 to be different to those before us and that case to be of limited assistance. The prosecution under s 105A of the Crimes Act for corrupt use of official information expressly required (in s 106) the leave of the Attorney-General. Sections 9A and 9C of the Constitution Act 1986 permitted the Attorney-General to delegate this decision-making function to the Solicitor-General and Deputy Solicitor-Generals, but the necessary delegation had not been made in accordance with the requirements under that Act. The Supreme Court held that the Attorney-General’s consent was a statutory pre-requisite that needed to be satisfied to commence the prosecution. The charges had been filed in contravention of the leave requirement in s 106 and were therefore a nullity. As we have explained, written delegation under the Rules was not required in this case.
  196. We do not uphold the Respondents’ submission that the filing of the Informations by persons other than the Executive Officer of the Adjudicative Committee was contrary to s 44(2) of the Racing Industry Act.
  197. First, we note that r LR173A provides that a charge is to be filed with, not by, the Executive Officer of the Adjudicative Committee. Secondly, the requirement in s 44 is that the Board is to ensure that its compliance functions and adjudication functions are performed independently of each other. It does not follow that Informations which are filed by persons who form a part of the Board’s compliance function (such as Mr Irving), as opposed to the adjudicative function, is in error. Mr Irving’s role in the RIB is investigative, as indeed his title suggests, not adjudicative. If this Adjudicative Committee, or any other Adjudicative Committee, had a role in the filing of the Informations, there would be merit in the Respondents’ argument. Neither this nor any other Adjudicative Committee has had any such role. This submission is misconceived.
  198. To conclude. The collection of urine and hair samples and the authority to file the Informations against the Respondents did not need to be a function of or a decision made by the RIB Board but one by the RIB entity in accordance with the provisions of s 44 and the Rules. In the case before us, by Racing Investigators carrying out functions and exercising powers on behalf of the RIB, pursuant to s 44(1)(a) and (3).
  199. The charges are not void ab initio; they are not nullities.
    The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
    Hair sample charges
  200. The collection of a hair sample from each of the Respondents constituted a search and the reasonableness of that search is therefore amenable to scrutiny for compliance with the right under s 21 of the NZBORA to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
  201. Both parties understandably relied upon Cropp v Judicial Committee in support of this proposition. Cropp, a jockey had been subject to a random requirement to provide a urine sample after a race meeting. The sample tested positive to amphetamine and methamphetamine. While the sample was taken on raceday, the Supreme Court considered the breadth of the relevant rule, which authorised the taking of samples other than on raceday and consequently is relevant to the taking of the hair samples from the two Respondents.
  202. The Supreme Court decision in Cropp established that the power in the Rules (the Rules of Thoroughbred Racing — but this logically applies also to the GRNZ Rules of Racing) requiring the random provision of bodily samples, which constituted a search, was subject to the right to be secure against unreasonable search.
  203. In addition, Cropp is authority for the proposition that the racing codes are lawfully entitled to impose drug testing rules on licence holders.
  204. The question, therefore, for this Committee is whether the search of each of the Respondents pursuant to r LR19C, the rule authorising the search, was reasonable in terms of s 21. In this regard, an important consideration is the Supreme Court’s finding that the testing “must be related to racing”. That case did not consider the risk that a jockey who was using drugs might contaminate an animal, but contamination is clearly a feature in the case before us.
  205. Rule LR19C requires that the RIB have cause to suspect a registered person has used any Class A controlled drug or any Class B controlled drug as defined in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 before requiring the person to supply a hair sample.
  206. The statutory threshold is one of suspicion. We do not seek to establish a standard below that of good or reasonable cause. We take guidance from the authorities on the expression good cause to suspect where it is been held to be mean that something is “possible or likely”. We note in particular Seven Seas Publishing Propriety Limited v Sullivan [1968] NZLR 663 at 666. Both parties accept that this threshold of suspicion is a low bar.
  207. The point of contention between the parties is whether the threshold in r LR19C was crossed. The key point in time is when the decision to require hair samples from each Respondent was made. We are aware that the subsequent positive hair results cannot retrospectively justify the original decision to require testing.
  208. The Respondents submit there was insufficient information before the RIB to give rise to a genuine and reasonable suspicion that Mr Johnson personally used cocaine. We note that there is no requirement in r LR19C that the RIB suspect use of a particular (named) drug, just a Class A or Class B drug. The Informant states that there was sufficient evidence.
  209. We believe the r LR19C suspicion threshold was met on the evidence.
  210. A discussion between Mr Irving, Ms Grieve and Dr Forbes concluded that this suspicion existed, and the requirement to provide a hair sample at an authorised drug detection agency was made of each of the Respondents by Racing Investigator, Mr Irving, by way of the service of a notice on 21 January 2026.
  211. We are satisfied that this requirement of each of the Respondents (and the two other persons tested) was, in Cropp terms, “related to racing” as a consequence of their training the respective greyhounds that had returned positive results for benzoylecgonine. There was an available and reasonable inference that these persons may have contaminated the greyhounds in question in the course of their handling of the animals. There were animal welfare concerns, and while we accept concern for the safety of other industry participants is less in greyhound racing than in equine racing (there being no jockey or driver involved, for example), there is a concern in respect of the handling of dogs, especially on raceday.
  212. We view the extent of the intrusion on the Respondents’ privacy as relevant to an assessment of the reasonableness of the search. In relation to r LR19C, the intrusion is at the lower end of the scale in that the taking of a hair sample does not involve an intrusive medical procedure (such as the use of a needle to take a blood sample) or a bodily search.
  213. With regard to the reliability of the sample taken from Ultra Instinct, the evidence of Mr Irving and our scene visit on the day of the hearing clearly demonstrated the fact that the emptying out area was open to the elements. It was not contained or secure, which we accept would be best practice. The sawdust in the urine sample taken from Ultra Instinct raised the possibility of contamination. And we are informed that this is why the RIB made the decision not to lay the presentation charge against the trainers of that dog.
  214. We do not accept the submission that the fact that the contaminated swab evidence (the sawdust in the urine sample) was viewed by the Informant as being too unreliable to support a presentation charge should also mean that it was insufficient to meet the suspicion standard to justify compelling Mr Johnson to provide a hair sample. The standard of proof for a charge under the Rules, as previously noted at [11], is on the balance of probabilities, with regard being had to seriousness of the charge; the standard of suspicion, as previously noted at [206], is considerably lower.
  215. The positive sample from Ultra Instinct was not the only matter that Mr Irving could and did consider in determining whether there was suspicion in terms of r LR19C.
  216. As Mr Irving stated in his brief of evidence, he was aware that in the history of drug testing in NZ Racing there had not been a previous benzoylecgonine or cocaine positive in an animal and the RIB now likely had four positives. In seven of nine previous human illicit drug (methamphetamine) positives in greyhounds there was evidence of a causative link to the trainer or a family member.
  217. We list the matters with respect to the forming of suspicion of Class A or B drug use by the Respondents.
  218. First in respect of Mr Johnson:
    • Ultra Instinct, a dog he trained, had tested positive to benzoylecgonine, indicating exposure to cocaine, a Class A drug;
    • Kaitoa, a dog trained by Mr Johnson’s mother, had tested positive to benzoylecgonine;
    • a clearance sample taken from Kaitoa on 12 January 2026 had also screened positive to benzoylecgonine, indicating ongoing exposure to cocaine;
    • Mr Johnson had been at Ms Middlewood’s kennel regularly to help his mother with the dogs;
    • Ms Middlewood did not think that Mr Johnson would have taken cocaine but said MDMA (ecstasy) was “pretty popular” with kids, and Mr Johnson had taken “acid” (the Class A drug, LSD)) at her house.
  219. We are satisfied that while the possibility of contamination of the sample by the sawdust in the sample from Ultra Instinct had been identified on the swab card, in the circumstances which we have outlined, including, in particular, the information imparted to Mr Irving by Ms Middlewood, it was possible or likely that the positive result in Ultra Instinct’s sample was due to Mr Johnson having used the Class A drug, cocaine, and thus Mr Irving had cause to suspect for the purposes of r LR19C.
  220. With respect to Ms Middlewood. First the drug charge under r LR19C(2):
    • Mr Irving knew that Kaitoa, a greyhound that she trained and had taken to the races, had tested positive to a Class A drug, cocaine (specifically its metabolite benzoylecgonine), and had continued to screen positive on a further occasion (12 January — result known 19 January) to that drug following a clearance sample being taken;
    • Ms Middlewood stated during her interview with Mr Irving that she would have been the only person transporting Kaitoa to the races on the day the dog returned the positive;
    • Ms Middlewood admitted when questioned by Mr Irving on 6 January 2026 that she had used class A drugs in December 2025.
  221. We are satisfied it was therefore “possible or likely” that Kaitoa’s sample had tested positive because Ms Middlewood had used Class A drugs, including cocaine.
  222. The requirement of both Mr Johnson and Ms Middlewood to give a hair sample was reasonable in the particular circumstances of each Respondent and was within the Rules. The search was not unreasonable, and the resulting evidence is admissible.
    Alternative findings on admissibility
  223. Clause 17.1 of the Third Schedule of the Rules gives us a broad discretion to admit as evidence any statement, document, information, or matters that may, in our opinion, assist us to deal justly, speedily, and inexpensively with the matters before us whether or not that statement, document, information, or matter would be admissible in a court of law. Nonetheless, we adopt the usual practice, although noting that this pertains in the criminal rather than in our disciplinary jurisdiction, of determining, should this conclusion later prove to be incorrect, whether the improperly obtained evidence, after balancing relevant factors, should be admitted despite it being obtained unlawfully or as a consequence of an unreasonable search.
  224. In that context the factors identified in s 30(3) of the Evidence Act 2006 offer guidance.
  225. The nature and extent of the impropriety — if we had found that the Informant had no power under the Rules to investigate the matter or to lay the Informations, in that this function was vested in the RIB Board and there had been no written delegation to Mr Irving, we would view this as a serious breach in that the person initiating the proceedings lacked the necessary legal authority; had the standard of suspicion not been met in r LR19C, we would view the breach as towards the lower end in that we would not find the actions of the Investigator, Mr Irving, were reckless or done in bad faith.
  226. The nature and quality of the evidence is undisputed analytical findings in both human (the hair samples) and animals (the positive swabs). If the evidence were to be admitted, it would prove the charges.
  227. The importance of the prohibited substances testing regime (the seriousness of the charges, in that animal welfare is at issue) — the offences are moderately serious, and disqualification would be a likely penalty.
  228. There was a degree of urgency in obtaining the evidence. Kaitoa and Ultra Instinct had both tested positive to benzoylecgonine and Kaitoa had screened positive again on a clearance sample, indicating ongoing exposure. We accept the Informant’s submission that in these circumstances there was need to ascertain with some urgency the source of exposure and eliminate any risk to the greyhounds themselves and to Industry participants.
  229. No alternative remedies other than exclusion of the evidence are available.
  230. On balance, we would find that if there was no power under the Rules to lay the Informations or to investigate the matters (in that this function was vested in the RIB Board and there had been no written delegation to Mr Irving) we would view this as a fundamental defect in the authority to commence proceedings and this would weigh in favour of exclusion of the evidence.
  231. Were the sole issue whether the search was unreasonable and in breach of s 21 of the NZBORA in that the r LR19C threshold was not crossed in either case, we would conclude that the balancing would weigh in favour of admission of the evidence.
    Presenting charges
  232. Next the presenting charges with respect to the greyhounds Kaitoa and Wow Wow.
  233. The insecure and non-sterile nature of the swabbing area at the Addington Raceway is considered with respect to the two raceday swabs from Kaitoa and Wow Wow.
  234. The RIB has stated that these are the only positives to benzoylecgonine recorded by the Industry. The insecure and non-sterile nature of the swabbing area we would have to conclude only affected Ms Middlewood’s two dogs, which returned three positive samples at Addington, and not any other dogs swabbed on these or other days that there was greyhound racing at that venue. Greyhound racing at Addington Raceway was a regular occurrence at this time.
  235. We also have to view this issue in the context that the dogs’ subsequent clearance samples at both Addington (Kaitoa) and Ms Middlewood’s kennels (Kaitoa and Wow Wow) were positive. It took four clearance samples from Kaitoa before the dog produced a negative result. Kaitoa returned positive results over a two and a half month period. Wow Wow only returned a negative result, after failing to produce a clear sample at Ms Middlewood’s kennels three weeks after the racing positive, on the same day Kaitoa was tested at the kennels (which was six weeks after Wow Wow’s first positive).
  236. That the collection of the samples on raceday was at the direction of the Chairman of Stewards rather than the Chief Steward or another Steward with a title designated in r 9 we do not believe rendered the samples unlawfully or improperly obtained. Giving a purposive interpretation to rr 9 and 136, we find the Steward in charge of the respective meetings, the “Chairman of Stewards”, was empowered to authorise the collection of urine samples under r 136. Were we to be wrong in this conclusion and were the evidence to be found to be improperly obtained, we would admit it pursuant to cl 17 of the Third Schedule to the Rules or after conducting a s 30 balancing, as to which see [223-230].
  237. The presentation offences are offences of strict liability. We are satisfied as to the reliability of the evidence supporting these charges. Neither that the two positive raceday samples were the result of contamination nor the defence that the charges are nullities is established. We are satisfied on the balance of probabilities, having regard to the seriousness of the matters before us, that these charges are proved.
    Decisions
    Mr Johnson
  238. We find the allegation in Information A19870 that on the 23rd of January 2026 in Hamilton, Mr Johnson, having been required by a Racing Investigator to supply a sample of hair in accordance with r LR19C(1) of the GRNZ Rules, provided hair which upon analysis was found to contain the Class A controlled drug cocaine and the Class B controlled drug MDMA, to be proved.
    Ms Middlewood
  239. We find the allegation in Information A19868 that on the 23rd of January 2026 in Christchurch, Ms Middlewood, having been required by a Racing Investigator to supply a sample of hair in accordance with r LR19C(1) of the GRNZ Rules, provided hair which upon analysis was found to contain cocaine, being a Class A controlled drug as defined in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, to be proved.
  240. We are satisfied to the required standard that Information A19866 is proved in that on the 11th of December 2025 at Addington Raceway, Ms Middlewood, licensed trainer of the greyhound Kaitoa, failed to produce the greyhound in race 14 of the Christchurch GRC meeting, free of the permanently banned prohibited substance, benzoylecgonine (cocaine metabolite).
  241. We also find that Information A19867 is proved in that on the 12th of January 2026 at Addington Raceway, Ms Middlewood, licensed trainer of the greyhound Wow Wow, failed to produce the greyhound in race 6 of the Christchurch GRC meeting, free of the permanently banned prohibited substance, benzoylecgonine (cocaine metabolite).
  242. We require written submissions as to penalty and costs from the Informant to be filed by Friday 27 November and from the Respondents by Friday 11 December 2026.
  243. We grant leave for the parties to apply to the Adjudicative Committee for further directions should these dates not prove suitable.

 

Decision Date: 13/11/2026

Publish Date: 16/11/2026